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Abstract:
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1.Executive summary
Recent growth in the Venture Capital (VC) industry has stimulated new research exploring the structure of Venture Capital deals. Available evidence shows that VCs not only support firms with essential financing, but also provide value-added services to their portfolio companies aimed at monitoring the progress and the management of firms.
While we now know much more on the mechanics of this industry still we have limited knowledge on the effect of VC activity in shaping and managing the governance structure of portfolio companies conditional and unconditional on the size of the investment injected and on the geographical area of the portfolio company.
In this paper we focus on the governance mechanisms adopted by companies which have received VC injections with regards to two specific issues: 1) the size of the investment provided by the VC and 2) the geographical region of incorporation of portfolio companies. These are important issues to both academic and practitioners for corporate governance is the essential mechanism allowing proper management of financial and corporate resources by aligning incentives of employees and investors, thus enabling oversight and control on companies. Yet, corporate governance rules and mechanisms are costly and have different effectiveness across countries. For these reasons we believe that with the increase in the size of capital injections in a portfolio company the number and mix of governance tools adopted will change significantly as a way to increase the probability of success of the investment. Similarly, the effectiveness in governance provisions is affected by the legal and cultural environment of the portfolio company. We therefore conjecture that companies may experience meaningful differences in the choice of governance instruments conditional on the geographical area of origin.
When investigating the governance of firms a common problem is the limited availability of reliable and consistent data due to the internal, non public nature of this information. This problem is particularly relevant for young, private companies such as those most likely to receive VC financing. An important feature of our paper is that we explore detailed governance decisions by building a novel hand-collected, questionnairebased database which allows a deeper level of analysis than possible with standard data adopted in literature. Our survey has covered six countries, namely UK, US, France, Germany, Sweden and Spain which represent the most active countries in the worldwide VC industry based on the relative level of investment. Questionnaires have been sent to a panel of over 500 companies that (1) have been first VC-backed between 2000 and 2005,
(2) were still in operations when the survey has been conducted and, (3) have not been acquired or publicly traded. The questionnaire addresses several questions on the investment size and syndication and specific governance issues like: how Board members are appointed and how decisions are taken, the strategy decision process and its amendments, the nature and structure of HR decisions at the CEO level and employee level. Differently from existing research we shed light on internal governance issues which previous literature has shown to be of critical relevance in determining the ratio of success of a company.
Our empirical results show that there is a strong and positive relationship between
VCs' funding and their influence on some factors like decisions on CEO hiring, executive compensation, board decisions and appointments. Employee incentives are also positively related to the proportion of VC funding. On the other hand, results show that the proportion of VC funding is only limitedly significant in explaining VC influence on strategy direction and investment planning. Our analysis though, offers a remarkably different view after splitting data into European and American subsamples. The two regions show different regularities with regards to corporate governance decisions: the proportion of VC funding is significant in explaining the VC influence on executive compensation, board decisions, and board appointments in US VC-backed companies while in European VC-backed companies, the amount of VC funding is positive and significantly related only to VC influence on investment planning. CEO hiring is similarly influenced by VCs in both Europe and US, but we observe considerably different Human Resources (HR) practices cross-country. The sharp differences highlighted in the two geographical areas are noteworthy since they signal a profound difference in the approach to venture investments which can be valuable to investors. In this paper we argue that differential cross-country results may be related to the institutionalization level of VCs in both continents: VC market in the US has developed much earlier than in Europe due to several factors among which the existence of an effective regulation on closed-end funds. On the other hand, most European countries have developed similar rules only in the late '90s. Additionally, development capital in Europe has traditionally been offered to companies by banks and, in some cases, large corporations. These institutions have been comparatively less focused on controlling the governances of investees than independent US venture capital firms, given the different characteristics and lower risk of bank and corporate capital infusions. Finally, as shown by recent contributions, differences in the legal enforcement of rules and regulations make the adoption of specific governance provisions differently valuable.
Introduction
Recent growth in the Venture Capital (VC) industry has stimulated new academic research exploring the structure of Venture Capital deals. Gompers (1995) , Hellman and
Puri (2002), Stromberg (2003, 2004) show that VCs not only support firms with essential financing, but also provide value-added services to their portfolio companies aimed at monitoring the progress and the strategy of firms. While we know much more than earlier studies, several research questions are still waiting answers, including the role and effects of VCs on the inner governance of firms, conditional and unconditional on the size of the investment injected and on the geographical area of the portfolio company. 
Theoretical background and hypotheses
Theoretical literature argues that when ownership and control are separated, principals develop government structures to reduce agency costs and align agents'
incentives (Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Grossman and Hart (1986) , Zingales (1995) ).
Likewise, optimal financial structure design by financial intermediaries can effectively help mitigating agency problems by identifying self-enforcing equilibria (Diamond (1984 ), Fama (1985 , Stiglitz (1985) , Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) , Barry (1994) ). A particularly fruitful testing ground for agency theories is the VC industry: since venture capital deals are primarily characterized by asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and financiers and almost exclusive capital infusion by outsiders, it is extremely likely to observe agency problems. In this spirit, Gorman and Sahlman (1989) and Sahlman (1990) first suggested that the value of VC lies not only in providing capital but also in superior selectivity by consistently picking high-growth firms, and in the provision of supplementary services such as: entrepreneurial advice, executives hiring and strategy shaping, resulting in a valuable "professionalization" of portfolio companies.
Following these seminal contributions, a large number of studies have investigated the mechanisms adopted by VCs to mitigate principal-agent conflicts identifying three broad classes of control mechanisms: intense pre-investment screening, the development of accurate financing contracts, and continuous post-investment monitoring and advisory. Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) , Lerner (1994a) , Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2004) shed light on pre-investment screening and syndication. Sahlman (1990 ), Berglof (1994 , Gompers (1995) , Bergmann and Hege (1998) Particularly, value-added tasks of VC include helping firms to shape strategies, providing technical and commercial advice (Bygrave and Timmons (1992) , Hellmann (1998) , Hellmann and Puri (2002) , Baker and Gompers (2003) Cornelli and Yosha (2003) )
Several questions though, remain unanswered in particular with regards to the extent of the influence of VCs on the governance of firms. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Williamson (1983) , first conjectured that the composition of the board should be shaped by the need for oversight. Lerner (1995) tests this intuition in the VC industry by looking at board representation of portfolio companies. Assuming that VCs are significant providers of managerial oversight, their representation on boards should be larger when there is a greater need for oversight. His findings show that that VCs are more likely to join or be added to the boards of private companies in periods when the CEO of the company changes. Baker and Gompers (1999) focus on board composition at IPOs. They argue that the optimal choice for board structure is made at the time of the IPO since existing shareholders bear the cost of suboptimal governance. Using data from 1,116 IPO prospectuses, they describe board size and composition for a set of firms with a median age of less than six years and a median equity capitalization of $42 million. According to their analysis, the number of insiders is 27 percent smaller in VC-backed firms, and the number of instrumental directors is 20 percent smaller. Kroszner and Strahan (2001) using banks board representation obtain similar results. Hellmann and Puri (2002) , provide additional insights on a set of governance actions in a hand-collected survey sample of 173 startups in the Silicon Valley. The authors show that VCs are influential not only at the top of the organization (in terms of replacing the original founders with an outside CEO as in Lerner (1995) ), but also in the developments further down the organization. Differently from previous studies, Stromberg (2000, 2004) document direct evidence on VC actions and monitoring. Analyzing investment decisions on portfolio companies at the time of the initial investment they find that while in 14% of the investments, the VCs play an active role in forming the management they trade off These contributions confirm the intuition that VCs do affect the governance of their portfolio companies by monitoring, giving advices, shaping strategies and helping their portfolio companies to grow. Surprisingly, though, existing studies leave two important issues largely unexplored: firstly, the link between the amount of VC financing and VC effect on company governance and secondly, the cross-country consistency of venture capitalist behavior in shaping portfolio companies governance structures.
In this paper we try to fill these gaps building on one hand on recent contributions by Bernile et al. (2007 ), Cumming (2006 and Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003a,b) on the size of Venture Capital portfolios and on the other hand, on the growing literature on systematic cross-country difference in financial practices, pioneered by La Porta et al.
( 1996) and recently applied to Venture Capital deals (Da Rin et al. (2006) , Cumming et al. (2008)).
Hypotheses
Sahlman (1990) first showed that VC fund returns are originated by the returns obtained on less than 30% of the portfolio companies with the remaining 70% experiencing zero returns or being entirely written off. This empirical evidence suggests that portfolio size can be a critical issue for investors as recently documented by Cumming (2005 Cumming ( , 2006 and theoretically supported by Bernile et al. (2007) , and Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003a,b) . Similarly, capital allocation can heavily affect performance. Gompers (1995) showed that a commonly adopted provision for controlling this potential threat is given by the existence of specific agreements between investors and managers requiring explicit approval of deals exceeding a fixed amount. Since investing large stakes in a company increases the fund riskiness it is natural to expect that VCs will exert higher control on these companies. We then conjecture our first research hypothesis:
HP 1: as the amount of VC funding in a company grows, VC effects on the governance of such a company increase..
Research on cross-country differences in corporate governance and its impact on financial decisions has been pioneered by LaPorta et al. (1996) which clearly documented that US and European corporate governance differ significantly due to structural differences in legal systems. Although a certain degree of convergence among corporate governance systems has been recently observed (Hopt and Leyens (2004) ), companies' performance and overall shareholder value are remarkably different cross-country. Aggarwal et al. (2006) document that 92% of the foreign firms surveyed show worse governance than matching US firms resulting in comparatively lower shareholder value.
In a recent contribution, Da Rin et al. (2006) further investigate this issue in the VC industry. Based on a four cross-country research project, they argue that investors from countries with a better legal tradition (US) will provide more governance and valueadded services. This superior governance translates in a shift of discretionary power from
CEOs to boards, as in Lerner (1994b) and Baker and Gompers (2003) , and in more elaborated incentive structures. Therefore, we conjecture,
HP 2: European VCs will show lower influence on board and employee related items and higher influence on CEO hiring than US investors.
VC investments are commoly syndicated, i.e. capital is provided by a pool of investors rather than a single venture capitalist. The rationale for this feature is that by syndicating investors can exert optimal portfolio diversification, superior selectivity and more efficient monitoring (Gompers and Lerner (2006) ). Syndication then reduces ex-ante uncertainty by allowing superior investment screening (Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007) ). This results in a lower default ratio and higher overall performance of syndicated investments as opposed to single-VC investments (Tian (2008) ). This generates a higher risk for venture capitalists investing alone, or in small syndicates. In such a case, a stricter control on the investment also through higher control on the governance of portfolio companies may alleviate the increased risk.
Accordingly, we postulate the following hypothesis: 
Data and summary statistics

4.1Data description
A common problem in investigating the governance of firms is the limited availability of reliable and consistent data due to the internal, non public nature of this information. This problem is particularly relevant for young, private companies such as those most likely to receive VC financing, as also highlighted by Cumming et al. (2008) .
The vast majority of existing papers rely on well-known data suppliers such as Venture Economics and Venture One 2 . Unfortunately, these data providers tend to include only standard accounting, financial and organization items such as capital infusions, investors involved in the deals, staging of capital contributions, performance metrics, board membership and exit strategies (Kaplan et al. (2002) ).
In this paper, we have developed a novel hand-collected, questionnaire-based survey database, supplementing missing information with data provided by the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA), National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), VentureXpert, and portfolio companies' websites. The data collection process has been as follows: first, we selected 20 European countries surveyed by EVCA plus the United
States, for which we had consistent and reliable data on both VC firms and companies. One of the studies relying on VentureEconomics data after it has been purchased by Securities Data Company (SDC) and become accessible to researchers in 1991, is Lerner (1995) . Please refer to Lerner (1995) for further description of VentureEconomics. 3 In this calculation process, we exclude United States as it clearly represents an outlier in the sample of countries here considered.
rationale for selecting a five-year period is to allow sufficient time for observing the VC influences without introducing too old firms in the sample.
We have executed our survey by submitting questionnaires by email ( In defining the questionnaire items for section two, we largely followed existing governance-related contributions in the VC literature. In particular, Gorman and Sahlman (1989) and Sahlman (1990) we conjecture that VCs effect at the top of the company will grow as the amount of VCs funding into a company grows. We have addressed these issues through specific questionnaire items which we have modeled as the following dependent variables: CEO
hiring (CEO), Executive Compensation (EXE), Board decisions (BODD), Board appointments (BODA). Variables are operationalized as Likert-type items with values
ranging from 1 to 4, where 1 indicates 'no' VC influence and 4 'high' VC influence. We opted for a four point rather than a five-point scale to avoid neutral responses that could possibly appear in the latter scaling.
5 Hellmann and Puri (2002) , show that VCs are influential not only at the top of the organization (in terms of replacing the original founders with an outside CEO as in Lerner (1995) ), but also in the developments further down the organization. The author
show that VC has a significant role also in designing Human Resources practices, employee incentive settings, shaping business strategies, and the investment planning process. According to Hellmann and Puri (2002) , the development of such human resource functions including employment security, incentive pay, promotion, skill development and training programs is an important aspect of professionalization. Baker and Gompers (1999) argue that VCs aim to improve employee incentives. Following the arguments of Hellmann and Puri (2000) , and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000) on VCs taking part in developing and/or improving strategies, strategic alliances, and investment planning through mergers and acquisitions, we attempt to examine the relationship between VC effects on the inner governance structures of companies (e.g. HR practices, business strategy direction, and investment planning) and the amount of VC funding in the company. We conjectured that VCs should still affect governance structures further down the organization such as HR practices, business strategy direction, and/or investment planning. Yet we expect this influence to be conditional on the amount of capital provided, i.e. when VCs financing into a company is large, VCs focus more on CEO hiring, board of directors' decisions or executive compensation rather than employee incentives, business strategy direction, or investment planning, and viceversa.
We address these issues by modeling four additional Likert-type variables ranging from 1 for each company in the sample horizon. This figure is collected from our survey data but we specifically cross-check with information on VentureXpert database: if data provided by the respondent is not consistent with publicly available information, we adopt the VentureXpert figure since literature on questionnaire-based data collection suggest a higher probability of mistake by the respondent rather than public database inaccuracy.
(no influence) to 4 (highest influence): HR practices (HR), Employee Incentives (EE), Strategy direction (STR), and Investment planning (INV).
Summary statistics
Controlling for data consistency resulted in ten changes.
Supplemental independent variables, extracted from VentureXpert, EVCA and NVCA (Menard (2005) ).
Given this sample composition we follow a two steps approach: firstly, we adopt OLS to understand the relationship between the amount of VC funding and VC influence. Then,
we apply multinomial regression analysis to check the OLS findings robustness.
We form our set of equations as follows:
Equation (1) aims at capturing the linear relationship between the amount of VC funding and VC influence in the full and geographical samples for every i independent variable included in our analysis.
where i y are the 8 dependent variables,
= is the vector of the m independent variables and β is the vector of parameters.
Equation (2) estimates the probabilities of the different dependent variable outcomes according to a standard multinomial logit regression:
where n X is the m-size vector of independent variables observed for every dependent variable n, β is the vector of maximum likelihood parameters and n y are the different categorical responses of the dependent variable.
Empirical results
Full-sample OLS results
In Table 3A and 3B, we provide linear estimation results for the full sample which includes data from VC-backed companies in US, UK, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden.
INSERT On the other side, our full sample results do not provide support for VC firms having an impact in the much broader issue of setting HR practices. We can argue that HR practices and strategy direction involve many sub-categories. For instance, CEO hiring, employee incentives and executive compensation issues are also included in overall HR practices term. Therefore, these mixed results illustrate that VCs are important in some HR decisions, mainly dealing with top executives, whereas they appear to be less influential in other parts of HR management. This intuition is supported by noticing that a highly significant driver of HR practices is company size as proxied by number of employees; the parameter is negative and significant suggesting that the smaller the company and the higher is the need for designing HR practices. When Surprisingly though, syndication is always insignificant as an explanatory variable indicating that the size of the syndicate is not a factor in determining governance practices. This result may be interpreted by looking at the general management structure of an investment syndicate: once the syndicate is formed, a lead role is assigned to one investor, generally the deal originator. A likely case is that the syndication leader will retain all the monitoring and control duties reporting periodically to the syndicate members (see Gompers and Lerner (2007) ). In such a case, the lead investor act 'as-if" he/she were a single investor thus implementing the same level of control also on governance issues.
Full sample multinomial regression results
To control for the robustness of the linear models, we apply multinomial regression to our data. The results are illustrated in Similarly, we observe that the regression coefficient of VC funding for the ratio (no or little VC influence) relative to (high VC influence) on HR practices and strategy direction, is not statistically different from zero also in models including all variables.
Therefore, we can confirm our linear full sample results that, in general, as the proportion of VC funding increases, the portfolio company does not exhibit higher VC influence in neither HR practices nor strategy direction.
Multinomial result also confirm the insignificance of the syndication variable, confirming that there is no differential impact on the governance of companies conditional on the number of investors injecting capital in the company.
Pseudo-R-square values indicate a good fit of the model in explaining the variations in the data. Compared to full sample linear regressions, in our multinomial regressions, we obtain consistent pseudo-R-squares, ranging from .115 to .297. The
Wald statistics for the logistic regression coefficients are shown in Table 4A and 4B and support the results' robustness.
Sub-Sample Results
The Country control dummy variable (US) in our aggregate models is strongly significant and negative suggesting sharp differences in practices between the two regions. To capture this relevant information we partition our survey data into European and American sub-samples. The empirical results are reported in Table 5A , 5B and Table   6A , 6B.
INSERT TABLES 5A AND 5B ABOUT HERE
The sub-sample analysis validates the results obtained on the governances of the VC-backed companies in our full sample: the proportion of VC funding seems to have influence in board decisions and appointments as well as in executive compensation and employee incentives. Interestingly, we find that the proportion of VC funding is not significant in shaping the variance in VC influence on HR practices, executive compensation, employee incentives, board appointments, board decisions, and strategy in portfolio companies that are located in Europe. The proportion of VC funding appears to be positively significant only in explaining the variance in VC influence on CEO hiring and investment planning of these companies. cross-country differences in the future.
Conclusions
Recent growth in the Venture Capital (VC) industry has stimulated new research exploring the structure of Venture Capital deals. Available evidence shows that VCs not only support firms with essential financing, but also provide value-added services to their portfolio companies aimed at monitoring the progress and the strategy of firms. While we now know much more on the mechanics of this industry still we have limited knowledge on the effect of VC activity in shaping and managing the governance structure of portfolio companies conditional and unconditional on the size of the investment injected and on the geographical area of the portfolio company. In this paper, we try to fill this gap by testing the impact of differential levels of capital injection and different regions of incorporation of portfolio companies on a unique hand-collected questionnaire-based dataset from 164 companies in 5 countries (US, UK, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden). By using survey data we have been able to explore governance decisions at a deeper level of analysis than allowed by data available through traditional providers. In designing the survey structure we have focused on a set of relevant and previously unexplored governance decisions in portfolio companies. no impact in the governance decisions. This result is unexpected because syndication is known to reduce the level of contractual ex-ante information asymmetry resulting in higher levels of ex-post investment performance. This would suggest that when investors cannot benefit from this incremental screening, they may have an incentive in controlling more closely portfolio companies addressing also sensitive corporate governance issues.
The absence of support to this intuition can be interpreted as a positive signal of homogeneity in the effort exerted by VCs due to the structure of the syndication process.
By assigning a single VC the leading role and accordingly delegating the control and monitoring tasks, the syndication process make lead investors to act as lone investors thus generating the invariance of results we have observed.
Yet, significant differences emerge when comparing European and American venturebacked companies., In Europe only CEO hiring, and investment planning decisions are positively influenced by VCs proportion of funding with no evidence of significant effects of VC funding on other aspects of portfolio companies' governance. Differently, for the American sub-sample we provide consistent evidence that the proportion of VC funding is significant and positively related to VC influence in a much larger set of issues such as CEO hiring, executive compensation, employee incentives, board decisions, and board appointments but it is not significant to explain the variance in VC influence in HR practices, strategy direction and investment planning. An interesting result is the absence of any industry effect in the US as opposed to a strong effect in Europe, which indicate that investments in high-risk ventures such as in the medical or computer industry, are accompanied by a stronger intervention by investors on a larger number of governance issues. These results provide a novel view of the functioning of the Venture Capital industry and its degree of pervasiveness in the management of portfolio companies and provide further support to the idea that the incremental contribution of a professional investor to a new venture is largely exceeding the capital infusion only.
Variables Description
VC% is the proportion of VC financing (of total financing) that is received by the firm. This variable takes a value between 0 and 100 and described as in percentage terms. #ofVCs is the number of different VC firms that have financed each of our sample firms for the last five years.
HR is a 4-point Likert scale variable that is described by a rate going from 1 to 4 that the firm reported that venture capitalists are influential in deciding overall human resource policies (1=no influence and 4= high influence).
EXE is a 4-point Likert scale variable that is described by a rate going from 1 to 4 that the firm reported that venture capitalists are influential in deciding the level of executive compensation (1=no influence and 4= high influence).
EE
is a 4-point Likert scale variable that is described by a rate going from 1 to 4 that the firm reported that venture capitalist are important in determining employee (other than CEO) incentives. (1=no influence and 4= high influence).
BODD is a 4-point Likert scale variable that is described by a rate going from 1 to 4 that the firm reported that the venture capitalists are influential in takeover decisions of board of directors (1=no influence and 4= high influence).
BODA is a 4-point Likert scale variable that is described by a rate going from 1 to 4 that the firm reported that the venture capitalists are influential in board of directors' appointments of the firms (1=no influence and 4= high influence).
CEO is a 4-point Likert scale variable that is described by a rate going from 1 to 4 that the firm reported that the venture capitalists are influential in CEO hiring decisions of the firms (1=no influence and 4= high influence).
INV
is a 4-point Likert scale variable that is described by a rate going from 1 to 4 that the firm reported that the venture capitalists are influential in investment planning of the firms (1=no influence and 4= high influence).
STR
is a 4-point Likert scale variable that is described by a rate going from 1 to 4 that the firm reported that the venture capitalists are influential in strategy direction of the firms (1=no influence and 4= high influence).
LnAGE
is the natural logarithm of the birth date of the firm.
Ln#EE is the natural logarithm of the number of employees working in the firm.
Computer is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is in computer related industry and 0 otherwise. Table 2 Full Sample EU US
Medical
Descriptive Statistics
Diff EU/US Mean values a nd sta nda rd deviations a re presented for the dependent and independent variables from Full, EU and US samples. VC influence on CEO hirin g, HR Practices, Executive compensation, Employee incentives, BoDD (Boa rd decisions), Bo DA (Board appointments), Strategy (Strategy Direction), a nd Invest (Investment planning), which are likert-type variables ranging from 1 to 4, 1 representing no influence and 4 indica ting high influence.The independent variables a re VC Funding, showing the proportion of VC funding received by Fu ll, EU a nd US samples companies; Compa ny Age; Number of Employees; Computer, Medica l a nd Other, wh ich are dummy varia bles taking value 1 if the company is in the computer, medical or other industry respectively; 0 otherwise; # VCs wh ich is the number of different VC investors funding sa mple companies; Startup, Expansion and Later are dummy va riables taking value 1 if the company is in the startup, expa nsion or later sta ge respectively; 0 otherwise. T-tests a re presented in the last column. Linear Regressions, single and complete models Table 3A The results from OLS regressions a re presented. The dependent variables a re VC influence on CEO hiring, HR pra ctices, Executive compensation, Employee incentives, Board decisions, Board a ppointments, Strategy, and Investment, which are likert-type va riables ranging from 1 to 4, 1 representing no influence and 4 indica ting high influence. The independent variables a re VC% showing the proportion of VC funding received by our sample companies; LnAge which is a natural logarithm of the company age; Ln # Employees which is a natural loga rithm of the number of company employees; Computer and Medical which a re dummy va riables taking value 1 if the company is in the computer or medica l industry respectively; 0 otherwise; # VCs which is the number of different VC investors funding sample companies; Startup and Expansion are dummy variables ta king va lue 1 if the company is in the startup pr expansion stage respectively; 0 otherwise. T-ratios are presented in parentheses. *, **, ** The results from OLS regressions are presented. The dependent va ria bles are VC influence on CEO hiring, HR pra ctices, Executive compensa tion, Employee incentives, Board decisions, Board a ppointments, Stra tegy, and Investment, which a re likert-type va ria bles ra nging from 1 to 4, 1 representing no influence a nd 4 indicating high influence. The independent va ria bles are VC% showing the proportion of VC funding received by our sample companies; LnAge which is a natural loga rithm of the compa ny age; Ln # Employees which is a na tura l loga rithm of the number of company employees; Computer and Medica l which a re dummy variables taking value 1 if the compa ny is in the computer or medica l industry respectively; 0 otherwise; # VCs which is the number of different VC investors funding sample compa nies; Startup and Expansion a re dummy variables taking va lue 1 if the company is in the startup pr expansion sta ge respectively; 0 otherwise. T-ra tios are presented in pa rentheses. *, **, ** Table 4B Dependent Variables
The results from multinomia l regressions are presented. The dependent variables a re VC influence on CEO hiring, HR practices, Executive compensation, Employee incentives, Boa rd decisions, Board a ppointments, Strategy, a nd Investment, which are likert-type va riables ra nging from 1 to 4, 1 representing no influence a nd 4 indicating high influence. The independent varia bles are VC% showing the proportion of VC funding received by our sample compa nies; LnAge which is a natural loga rithm of the compa ny age; Ln # Employees which is a natural loga rithm of the number of company employees; Com puter a nd Medica l which a re dummy variables ta king value 1 if the compa ny is in the computer or medica l industry respectively; 0 otherwise; # VCs which is the number of different VC investors funding sa mple companies; Startup is a dummy va ria ble taking va lue 1 if the company is in the sta rtup stage ; 0 otherwise. Wald sta tistics are presented in pa rentheses. 1,2,3 represent the VC influence rating from survey responses, 4 is accepted a s the reference category. *, **, *** mean the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively. Table 6A VC influence on US VC-backed companies, linear regressions single and complete models
The results from OLS regressions for America n sub-sample a re presented. The dependent va riables a re VC influence on CEO hiring, HR pra ctices, Executive compensa tion, Employee incentives, Boa rd decisions, Boa rd appointments, Stra tegy, a nd Investment, which a re likert-type va ria bles ra nging from 1 to 4, 1 representing no influence a nd 4 indica ting high influence. The independent va ria bles a re VC% showing the proportion of VC funding received by our sa mple compa nies; LnAge which is a na tura l loga rithm of the company a ge; Ln # Employees which is a na tura l loga rithm of the number of compa ny employees; Computer and Medica l which a re dummy va riables ta king va lue 1 if the compa ny is in the computer or medica l industry respectively; 0 otherwise; # VCs wh ich is the number of different VC investors funding sa mple compa nies; Sta rtup and Expa nsion a re dummy va ria bles ta king va lue 1 if the compa ny is in the sta rtup or expa nsion sta ges ; 0 otherwise. T-ra tios a re presented in pa rentheses. *, **, *** mea n the coefficient is significa nt a t 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively. Cont'd-VC influence on US VC-backed companies, linear regressions single and complete models Table 6B The results from OLS regressions for America n sub-sa mple a re presented. The dependent va ria bles a re VC influence on CEO hiring, HR practices, Executive compensation, Employee incentives, Boa rd decisions, Board a ppointments, Stra tegy, a nd Investment, which a re likert-type variables ra nging from 1 to 4, 1 representing no influence a nd 4 indicating high influence. The independent varia bles are VC% showing the proportion of VC funding received by our sa mple companies; LnAge which is a na tura l loga rithm of the company age; Ln # Employees which is a natural logarithm of the number of company employees; Computer and Medica l which are dummy variables taking va lue 1 if the compa ny is in the computer or medica l industry respectively; 0 otherwise; # VC s which is the number of different VC investors funding sa mple companies; Sta rtup and Expansion a re dummy va ria bles ta king va lue 1 if the compa ny is in the startup or expa nsion stages ; 0 otherwise. T-ra tios a re presented in pa rentheses. *, **, *** mean the coefficient is significa nt a t 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
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